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Europe and Security Issues in Space: 
The Institutional Setting 
 
Frans von der Dunk 
Professor of Space Law, Space and Telecommunications Law Program, University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
 
In the current timeframe, the relevance of 
discussions on the existing use of space for 
national security purposes and the potential of 
it to be used for non-peaceful purposes are 
clearly increasing.1 As a consequence, it 
becomes more important to address the role of 
Europe as a geopolitical, albeit far from 
monolithic, entity in this context. 
 
From this perspective, the present paper 
analyzes some of the fundamental institutional 
parameters shaping the European presence in 
the space security domain, focusing on the 
two key players in space, which are truly 
European, the European Space Agency (ESA) 
and the European Union (EU).2 Interestingly, 
the starting point for both entities was that the 
security domain was a “no-go” area, a starting 
point that only over the last two decades has 
begun to erode. That is why, in addition the 
Western European Union (WEU), Europe has 
a certain role in this context, precisely from 
 
                                                
1Note that the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities 
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including 
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (hereafter, Outer Space 
Treaty or OST) only requires states to refrain from orbiting or 
otherwise placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit, as 
well as to undertake activities in exploring and using outer 
space “for the benefit and in the interests of all countries.” 
The phrase of “peaceful purposes” is only applied explicitly 
to the Moon and other celestial bodies. 
2ESA was established by means of the Convention for the 
Establishment of a European Space Agency (hereafter, ESA 
Convention); and the EU, as an overarching institutional 
structure encompassing in particular the European 
Community, was established by the Treaty on European 
Union. 
the security perspective rather than from the 
space perspective.3 
 
Even the European Community, as the most 
tightly developed “pillar” of the EU, could not 
be considered a supranational entity let alone a 
federal state. In all cases therefore, the 
individual member states of those 
organizations are still relevant as players in 
their own right. These states continue to be 
essential to determining the shape of European 
actions and approaches in the field of space 
issues, and this is even truer for the security 
domain. 
 
The resulting complicated institutional 
landscape represents the backdrop against 
which, as well as a set of crucial parameters 
within which, European policies in the area of 
space are developed. This applies to the space 
security domain, whether one takes a broad 
approach as with Space Situational Awareness 
(SSA) and the handling of space debris, or a 
more limited one, focusing on international 
terrorism or the handling of export controls 
over dual-use sensitive goods.4 
 
3The Western European Union was established by means of 
the Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration 
and Collective Self-Defense, Brussels, entered into force 25 
August 1948. 
4See Frans von der Dunk, “A European “Equivalent” to 
United States Export Controls: European Law on the Control 
of International Trade in Dual-Use Space Technologies,” 
Astropolitics 7 (2009): 110. 
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The European Space Agency 
 
The starting point for understanding the 
present and potential role of ESA in the wider 
context of European space security 
discussions is provided by the general 
institutional structure of the Agency. ESA, 
headquartered in Paris, France, but with 
additional establishments in a handful of other 
European countries, currently counts eighteen 
member states.5 Thus, it clearly constitutes an 
intergovernmental organization in the classical 
public international legal sense of the word. 
 
Given the complexities of European 
integration, ESA has, as of yet, no formal 
relationship with the EU beyond a number of 
cooperative agreements, of which the 
Framework Agreement is the most generic 
and broad one.6 The Framework Agreement 
does establish a joint EU-ESA Space Council, 
but this Council’s competences remain 
confined to “the coordination and facilitation 
of cooperative activities” under the 
Agreement, and thus present a forum for 
consultation and coordination of joint 
activities, not a means to impose such joint 
activities upon one or the other party.7 From 
the same perspective, the joint EU-ESA 
European Space Policy of April 2007 is a 
                                                 
                                                
5The list of member states comprises: Austria, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom. In addition, non-European Canada is a long-
standing cooperating partner under a special agreement, 
whereas Hungary, Romania, and Poland qualify as European 
Cooperating States under another special agreement. 
6Framework Agreement Between the European Community 
and the European Space Agency (hereafter Framework 
Agreement), entered into force 28 May 2004. See further 
Stephen Hobe, et al, A New Chapter for Europe in Space,” 
Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht I: 54 (2005): 342-344. 
7Article 8(1), Framework Agreement. See also Article 2(1), 
providing for cooperation to take place “with due regard to 
their respective tasks and responsibilities;” Article 4(1), 
calling for “compliance with its own prerogatives, legal 
instruments, and procedures” of each party; and Article 5, 
detailing the way joint initiatives could be undertaken. 
political commitment to develop a coordinated 
policy, not for establishing legal obligations 
between the two parties regarding cooperation 
activities, either in general or in particular, and 
the high-level space policy group plays its role 
in exactly that context. 
 
The Framework Agreement increased 
coordination and cooperation in policy matters 
and may well lead to the establishment of 
proper legal commitments of one party to the 
other, and/or official resignation of certain 
legal competences in deference to the other’s 
competences at some point in the future. 
Presently, however, ESA is neither an agency 
of the EU nor legally subject to the extended 
legal regime developed on the basis of the 
European Community (EC) Treaty – and it 
does not even count the same European states 
as members – e.g., ESA member states 
Norway and Switzerland are not members of 
the EU and eleven EU member states as of yet 
are not member states of ESA. 
 
ESA has two main organs. First, there is the 
Council, consisting of representatives of the 
sovereign member states, often at Ministerial 
level, and acting as the supreme body of the 
organization. The Council is tasked to lead: 
the annual work plans of the Agency; the 
annual general budget of the Agency; each 
program budget; the financial regulations and 
all other financial arrangements of the 
Agency; decisions on the admission of new 
member states; and all other measures 
necessary for the fulfillment of the purpose of 
the Agency within the framework of the ESA 
Convention.8 In other words, the Council, and 
thereby ESA, has not, at the highest level, the 
formal competence to draft space policies – it 
is only charged with “elaborating and 
implementing a long-term European space 
policy” by means of the exercise amongst 
 
8See Article XI(5), ESA Convention. 
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others of such competencies as enumerated 
above.9 
 
Second, the ESA Director General (DG) 
together with other ESA staff does not 
constitute a policy-making organ formally 
speaking. The DG is tasked to manage the 
Agency and execute any such programs “in 
accordance with the directives issued by the 
Council” as well as being entitled to submit 
proposals for future programs and projects.10 
As to that latter competence, the actual impact 
the DG may have on the formulation of 
programs and projects, and perhaps informally 
and/or indirectly of policies, depends upon a 
number of interlocking factors of a non-legal 
nature. Yet that impact would be subject to 
confirmation and a form of high-level control 
by the Council as enshrined in the latter’s 
competencies and thus by ESA member states 
jointly. 
 
ESA’s general aims and purposes are 
summarized by the ESA Convention “to 
provide for and to promote, for exclusively 
peaceful purposes, cooperation among 
European States in space research and 
technology and their space applications, with a 
view to their being used for scientific purposes 
and for operational space applications 
systems.”11 For good reason, ESA has often 
been described as a vehicle for member states 
to both serve their individual space policy 
needs, where applicable, and try and establish 
a European space policy. Formally speaking, 
as discussed, the Council in using its 
competencies decides more on programs and 
projects, even if at a high-level, and thus gives 
substance and shape to policies largely 
emanating at the member state level. 
 
                                                 
                                                
9Ibid., Article II(a). 
10See Ibid., Article XII(1.b). 
11Ibid., Article II. 
The key to further understanding the proper 
role of ESA in the shaping of European 
policies and regulations relevant to space 
security therefore lies in the way in which 
ESA space programs are developed. Program 
development, generally speaking, can be one 
of three kinds. 
 
Firstly, there are the “mandatory activities,” in 
which all ESA member states are obligated to 
participate in. To approve a relevant proposal, 
to undertake an ESA program, and to establish 
it as a mandatory activity, a simple majority of 
the member states is required. However, the 
level of resources to be made available for that 
program requires unanimity, which allows 
individual states to exert considerable power 
on the overall process of making a program 
happen or not.12 
 
Mandatory activities concern the execution of 
basic activities, such as education, 
documentation, studies of future projects, 
research work, and scientific programs 
including satellites and other space systems. 
To the extent follow-up activities on the 
ground are concerned, ESA should “collect 
relevant information and disseminate it to 
Member States, draw attention to gaps and 
duplication, and provide advice and assistance 
for the harmonization of international and 
national programs.”13 Further to the 
mandatory character of the participation of all 
member states in these scientific, non-space 
activities, the financing of such activities once 
properly agreed is taking place through a pre-
determined scale of respective contributions.14 
 
 
12See Ibid., Article XI(5.a), sub-paragraphs (i), (ii) and (iii). 
13Ibid., Article V(1.a), sub-paragraphs (i), (ii) and (iii). See 
further Kevin Madders, A New Force at a New Frontier: 
Europe’s Development in the Space Field of Its Main Actors, 
Policies, Law and Activities from its Beginnings up to the 
Present (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 189, 223-235. 
14See Ibid., Article XIII(1). 
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Secondly, ESA member states may agree on 
“optional activities” – again by a simple 
majority.15 The optional character then 
manifests itself by way of an opt-out clause, as 
it is provided that “all Member States 
participate apart from those that formally 
declare themselves not interested in 
participating therein.”16 This results in the 
clear possibility for a member state, if it 
considers it not to be in its own interests, 
including security interests, to abstain from 
participation in ESA optional activities. 
 
Optional activities also result in a different 
schedule for financing. Whereas the formula 
here is an opt-out from the standard rule of 
financing in proportion to the average national 
income over the most recent three years for 
mandatory programs,17 in actual practice 
things turn out to work differently. Normally, 
individual member state contributions are 
decided from the ground up, i.e., each state 
promises as following from its own particular 
measure of interests in such activities to 
contribute a certain percentage to the proposed 
budget of a certain program. Once the 
proposed optional program reaches a certain 
threshold in terms of promised financing it is 
formally accepted as an ESA optional 
program. 
 
Optional activities concern in particular the 
space programs, as opposed to preparation for 
them and their after-mission interpretation and 
usage: “the design, development, construction, 
launching, placing in orbit, and control of 
satellites and other space systems; and the 
design, development, construction, and 
operation of launch facilities and space 
transport systems.”18 Over the years, in 
                                                 
 
                                                
15See Ibid., Article XI(5.c), sub-paragraph (i). 
16Ibid, Article V(1). 
17See Ibid., Article XIII(2). 
18Ibid., Article V(1.b). See further Kevin Madders, A New 
Force at a New Frontier: Europe’s Development in the Space 
Field of Its Main Actors, Policies, Law and Activities from its 
monetary terms, programs with an optional 
character have made up 80% to 85% of the 
activities developed by ESA itself, as opposed 
to 15% to 20% being mandatory in nature.19 
 
Many of the details of how programs are 
developed and executed follow from what is 
labeled “the industrial policy which the 
Agency is to elaborate and apply” as part of 
the broader aims and objectives under Article 
II of the ESA Convention, and Annex V, 
which elaborates that generic industrial 
policy.20 
 
These cornerstones of ESA industrial policy 
are implemented by means of the 
“geographical distribution” approach, to 
“ensure that all Member States participate in 
an equitable manner, having regard to their 
financial contribution.”21 The result of that 
approach, further elaborated in Annex V to the 
ESA Convention, is often labeled “fair 
return,” “industrial return,” or “juste retour.” 
Under juste retour, each member state should 
roughly see its investment in a particular 
program “returned” in the form of contracts 
for its space industry, preferably for the very 
program at issue, in the alternative as 
compensated by contracts in other programs.22 
 
 
 
Beginnings up to the Present (Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 189-195, 235. 
19See Kevin Madders cited above, 189. 
20Ibid., Article VII(1). 
21Ibid., Article VII(1.c).  
22See Ibid., Articles II, IV, and Annex V. While the ideal 
“overall return coefficient” [Article IV(3)] implies that every 
Euro contributed by a member state should be matched 
exactly by a Euro’s worth of contract value for a company 
from that member state under a contract by the Agency, there 
are a number of complicated arrangements in place to allow 
for considerable flexibility. See further Madders, 384-8. 
Moreover, due to pressure from the EU in recent years, which 
views this system with some suspicion, as it may easily have 
anti-competitive effects within the European market, the 
general application of the concept has become more relaxed 
still. 
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The dichotomy between mandatory and 
optional activities has, throughout the decades 
of ESA operations, been shown to work as a 
remarkably pragmatic and workable 
compromise. It allows at the same time 
respect for the need for states to maintain their 
sovereign independence in choosing to 
contribute to and participate in actual space 
programs – on an á la carte-basis as it were – 
and serving the need for some coherence in 
ESA programs, in order for ESA to provide 
any added value in terms of real cooperation 
and an efficient pooling of resources. 
 
The ESA Convention mentions a third 
category of activities, one not as such 
conjured up by or within the framework of the 
Agency itself, but undertaken upon the 
specific request of third parties, namely 
“operational activities.”23 As a consequence, 
these activities are not financed by the normal 
budget of ESA, but paid for, in principle on a 
full-cost, not-for-profit basis,24 by the state, 
organization, or entity requesting such 
services.25 
                                                 
                                                
23See Ibid., Article V(2). 
24Such a monetary reimbursement could of course be 
(partially or completely) waived to the extent ESA considers 
other interests to merit the provision of such service without 
(full) reimbursement, and/or ESA considers itself de facto 
reimbursed by in-kind compensation. For example in the 
context of the International Space Station (ISS), it is common 
practice that the partners exchange services and goods as 
much as possible on a closed-purse, no-exchange-of-funds 
basis. See Article 15(5), Agreement among the Government of 
Canada, Governments of Member States of the European 
Space Agency, the Government of Japan, the Government of 
the Russian Federation, and the Government of the United 
States of America concerning Cooperation on the Civil 
International Space Station, Washington, entered into force 
27 March 2001. 
25In the past, ESA has provided such services for individual 
states, other international organizations, such as the European 
Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites 
(EUMETSAT), established by the Convention for the 
Establishment of a European Organization for the 
Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites entered into force 19 
June 1986, as amended 14 July 1994, and entered into force 
27 July 1994, and private companies, such as Arianespace. 
ESA Involvement 
in Space Security Issues 
 
While as of yet not addressing to any specific 
extent the actual or possible role of ESA in 
shaping European space security issues, in 
general terms, the possibility to become so 
involved at various levels depends on the 
interest of individual ESA member states. In 
particular, the major investors in ESA and 
ESA programs – France, Germany, Italy, the 
United Kingdom, and Spain – need to possess 
the political will and wherewithal in having 
ESA become so involved. 
 
Article II of the ESA Convention underscores 
this point, stressing that ESA activities should 
be for “exclusively peaceful purposes.” To 
start with, the general discussion during the 
Cold War on the precise meaning of “peaceful 
purposes” is important to consider as this 
phrase was – with the same addition of 
“exclusively” – found in the outer space 
treaties.26 Here, European states were inclined 
to occupy the middle ground between the 
liberal United States (U.S.) interpretation that 
peaceful purposes included military purposes 
as long as of a defensive nature and the stricter 
Soviet interpretation that any military use of 
outer space was prohibited under that concept. 
 
The word “exclusively” constitutes an 
interesting addition here; prima facie it 
suggests that without that addition ESA would 
also be entitled to act not for peaceful 
purposes. If that were to be true, however, the 
phrase “peaceful purposes” without that 
addition would be devoid of any meaning – 
essentially stating that ESA would be entitled 
to conduct activities for peaceful purposes 
whilst leaving it open to also conduct non-
 
26See Article IV, Outer Space Treaty, also Article XI referring 
to “peaceful exploration and use;” and Article 3(1), 
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies (hereafter Moon Agreement), 
entered into force 11 July 1984. 
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peaceful activities, since the addition of 
“exclusive” would be considered necessary to 
close the door on the latter option. 
 
In other words: the addition of “exclusively” 
does not effectively add anything to the legal 
obligation, and should rather be understood as 
a politically-driven confirmation of an 
obligation already existing as regard to 
“peaceful obligations,” to make sure no 
misunderstanding would arise on the scope of 
ESA’s activities. ESA did not wish to 
antagonize the U.S. by contradicting its liberal 
interpretation, yet at the same time was not 
willing to allow any uncertainty regarding the 
legal inability of ESA to get involved in 
military and security-related space projects. 
Copying the adverb “exclusively” from the 
space treaties and inserting it in the ESA 
Convention precisely achieved both results 
simultaneously. 
 
Following the Framework Agreement, even as 
this agreement did not refer in any manner to 
space activities with a security, defense, 
and/or military component, ESA has gradually 
adopted a more liberal interpretation.27 At 
least the word “security” is no longer taboo 
now: an ESA Security Agreement, ESA 
Security regulations, and an ESA Security 
office were established, as was an ESA 
security classification system with an “ESA 
Secret” label where handling of relevant 
classified information was moved from the 
member states to ESA itself. 
                                                
 
But as ESA re-interpreted “peaceful purposes” 
in 2003 to mean it could unambiguously be 
involved in military and defense related 
security activities, the aforementioned 
institutional structure remains in operation. 
ESA programs could only become a reality 
 
27See European Space Agency Council, “Position Paper on 
ESA and the Defense Sector,” ESA/C 153 (1 December 
2003): 7-8. 
following a majority vote by the member 
states in the ESA Council on the program plus 
unanimity on the financing, and this would 
ensure that no ESA project would see the light 
of day unless member states were satisfied it 
would not unduly interfere with their 
sovereign security concerns, including 
compliance with their own understanding of 
“peaceful purposes.” Only with the projects of 
Galileo and Global Monitoring for 
Environment and Security (GMES) to be 
discussed below, that started to change 
fundamentally, due as well to the role of the 
EU with these projects – and then still only so 
far as those member states allowed. 
 
Further to that, ESA from the beginning could 
not completely escape from the inevitable 
relationship between space activities and the 
issue of security. Satellite-based Earth 
observation can without difficulty encompass 
“spying,” the difference between launching a 
missile and launching a payload is often 
negligible from the technical perspective and 
the high-technology character and global 
scope of much of human spaceflight 
endeavors inevitably causes it to have 
important security angles. As such, the ESA 
framework has had to deal with security-
sensitive aspects of its “exclusively peaceful” 
mandate. 
 
For example, in deviation from the normal 
requirement to exchange data on programs, 
until the aforementioned recent establishment 
of an ESA Secret label, ESA member states 
were not required “to communicate any 
information obtained outside the Agency” if 
such communication would present a threat to 
its national security, would be inconsistent 
with its agreements with third parties, such as 
non-ESA partners in space cooperation 
ventures, or would be inconsistent with the 
terms and conditions under which it had 
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obtained the information at issue in the first 
place.28 
 
Along similar lines, a fundamental 
technology-transfer control limitation was 
built into the ESA Convention. If technology 
or products developed in the context of ESA 
activities are to be transferred to non-ESA 
member states, a special authorization regime 
to be adopted by a two-thirds majority of 
member states in the ESA Council is required, 
ensuring that such authorization will not be 
lightly provided.29 
 
In more general terms, not only the 
implementation of new programs, but also the 
admission of new member states to the 
Agency requires a unanimous vote in favor by 
the incumbent member states in the ESA 
Council.30 This is a common provision in the 
charters of intergovernmental organizations, 
but in the present context it serves to 
scrutinize any potential new member from the 
perspective of security risks, since once such a 
state becomes a member it would be entitled 
to the default paradigm of free flow and 
exchange of relevant information on ESA 
programs, technology, and products.31 For 
similar reasons, unanimity in the ESA Council 
is required before ESA may cooperate and 
conclude relevant agreements with other 
intergovernmental organizations, non-EU 
governments, and other non-ESA member 
state institutions.32 
 
A final example of ESA’s involvement in 
security issues concerns the development of 
the Ariane launcher. The single-most security-
sensitive space sector is the production and 
operation of launch vehicles, in view of the 
                                                 
                                                
28Article III(1), ESA Convention. 
29See Ibid., Article XI(5.j). 
30See Ibid., Articles XI(5.k), XXII. 
31See Ibid., Article III in extenso. 
32See Ibid., Article XIV(1). 
very thin lines among a vehicle for launching, 
an explosive payload against a terrestrial 
target, and a vehicle for delivering a peaceful 
payload in orbit. Not accidentally, this area 
was the first to be subject to international, 
albeit largely voluntary, arrangements – the 
Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR)33 – to try and curb the proliferation 
of relevant technologies outside the circle of 
former Western allies. 
 
As long as the Ariane launcher development 
project was an (optional) ESA program, the 
exclusively peaceful requirement of Article II 
of the ESA Convention precluded any Ariane 
vehicle being used for military or other 
security-related missions, under the European 
interpretation discussed before. Once the 
Ariane vehicle, however, had achieved 
operational status, i.e., could start to be used 
for regular flights on a commercial basis, ESA 
had to outsource operational and marketing 
activities, as ESA was also limited by its 
Convention to research and development 
(R&D), even if those terms were sometimes 
stretched considerably.34 
 
In the case of Ariane, a separate private and 
commercial entity was established in 1980 
called Arianespace.35 Arianespace is a French 
company with international shareholding as 
well as ties with ESA and the ESA member 
states, but nevertheless operating on its own 
behalf in the emerging global commercial 
 
33Agreement on Guidelines for the Transfer of Equipment and 
Technology Related to Missiles (hereafter MTCR), done 16 
April 1987. Also, See Elisabeth S. Waldrop, “Integration of 
Military and Civilian Space Assets: Legal and National 
Security Implications,” Air Force Law Review 55 (2004): 
189-90; and Frans von der Dunk, “A European “Equivalent” 
to United States Export Controls: European Law on the 
Control of International Trade in Dual-Use Space 
Technologies,” Astropolitics 7 (2009). All current 18 ESA 
member states are among the 34 state parties of the MTCR. 
34Article II, ESA Convention. 
35Statuts de la Société Arianespace (Arianespace Statute), 26 
March 1980. 
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launch services market. Its operations, 
however, from the international space law 
perspective, remained under control of the 
ESA member states, by way of a complicated 
international legal structure with three 
documents at the core: the Arianespace 
Declaration,36 the Arianespace Convention,37 
and the Centre Spatial Guyanais (CSG) 
Agreement.38 Under the first two documents, 
Arianespace is obliged to operate strictly for 
peaceful purposes.39 
 
Yet as a private French company, Arianespace 
remained under French governmental control. 
For example, prior to the MTCR, for the 
purpose of adhering to the Coordinating 
Committee on Multilateral Export Controls 
(CoCom) rules,40 i.e., the North Atlantic 
                                                 
                                                
36Declaration by Certain European Governments Relating to 
the Ariane Launcher Production Phase (hereafter 
Arianespace Declaration), entered into force 15 October 1981, 
renewal as of 4 October 1990, entered into force 21 May 
1992. 
37Convention between the European Space Agency and 
Arianespace (hereafter Arianespace Convention), signed 24 
September 1992. 
38Agreement between the French government and the 
European Space Agency with respect to the Centre Spatial 
Guyanais (CSG) (hereinafter CSG Agreement). See excerpts 
of French version in ESA Bulletin 80 (November 1994): 67. 
39See Articles I.1.2(a), I.1.6(a), Arianespace Declaration, 
ESA/C(80)8, 11 January 1980; Articles 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3, 
Arianespace Convention, ESA/C(80)WP/8, rev.4, 18 
November 1980; further see John Kriger, Arturo Russo, and 
Lorenza Sebesta, A History of the European Space Agency 
1958-1987: Volume II: The Story of ESA, 1973 to 1987, ESA 
History Study Reports, SP-1235 (ESA Publications, 2000); 
and Gabriel Lafferranderie and Harry Tuinder, “The Role of 
ESA in the Evolution of Space Law,” Journal of Space Law 
22 (1994): 103. 
40CoCom was established in 1949 as a joint organization of 
the member states of NATO, Japan, and Australia, to prevent 
the sale of weapons and technology to the Soviet Union and 
its communist allies. CoCom was disbanded in 1994, 
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the 
concurring de facto end of the Cold War, which inter alia 
resulted in the opening up in principle of Russian and Eastern 
European markets. See Michael Lipson, “The Reincarnation 
of CoCom: Explaining Post-Cold War Export Controls,” The 
Non-Proliferation Review 6 (1999): 33-51. 
Treaty Organization (NATO) regime41 for 
controlling security-sensitive exports, 
Arianespace fell under French governmental 
control. 
 
Thus, even the areas where the exclusively 
peaceful mandate for ESA could not as such 
avoid a possible entanglement in security or 
military issues, control mechanisms and 
procedures were in place. These mechanisms 
and procedures ensure that the potential 
threats to the security of individual member 
states emanating from such entanglement 
continue to be addressed without substantially 
infringing their sovereignty. 
 
 
The European Union 
 
The involvement in space and space policy 
issues, including space security, of the EU, as 
the successor at a political, if not completely 
at the legal level, of the European Community, 
stems from a completely different background 
compared to that of ESA. The Community, 
then Union became involved in European 
space activities and related policy issues 
primarily as a regulator, and has only recently 
become a player in its own right, even a 
policy-maker – but this remains a secondary 
role. 
 
In spite of efforts to arrive at a European space 
policy,42 driven by the European 
Commission’s perception that space is a key 
sector to the future of Europe, in this area (as 
 
41NATO was established by the North Atlantic Treaty, 
entered into force 24 August 1949. 
42See White paper: Space: a new European frontier for an 
expanding Union – An action plan for implementing the 
European Space policy, COM(2003) 673 final, of 11 
November 2003; Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament – European Space 
Policy – Preliminary Elements, COM(2005) 208 final, of 23 
May 2005. See further Stephen Hobe, et al, “A New Chapter 
for Europe in Space,” Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht 
I: 54 (2005): 340. 
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in many others) the ultimate prerogative of 
giving substantial shape to space policies by 
implementing actual programs and projects 
rests with the individual, sovereign member 
states. As referred to earlier, a joint Space 
Policy has been accepted recently, in 2007. 
 
This is clearly only a first step for the EU, 
whereas the second, more important step of 
being in charge of implementing such a space 
policy, of being able to force unwilling or 
conflicting national authorities in terms of 
their own space policies, and of developing its 
own space projects on its own behalf, is only 
beginning to be undertaken with Galileo. 
Currently, the first contracts for building of 
the Galileo satellites and deployment of the 
system have been signed. 
 
A distinct and partly supranational legal order 
has by now emerged, where in many instances 
the EU can in law override the interests, 
policies, and even legislation of individual 
member states, yet in the last resort all that is 
still based on a number of treaties between 
sovereign states. Together these treaties form 
a body of primary EU law, inter alia creating 
the main Union organs, officially referred to 
as: the Council (of Ministers),43 the European 
Commission,44 the European Parliament,45 the 
European Court of Justice,46 and most recently 
augmented by a European Council comprised 
of heads of state and government entitled to 
develop policies – but based on consensus, 
and without being formally entitled to guide 
                                                 
                                                
43See Articles 227-243, Treaty Establishing the European 
Community as Amended by the Treaty of Lisbon Amending 
the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community (hereafter Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union), entered into force 1 December 2009. 
44See Articles 244-250, Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. 
45See Ibid., Articles 223-234. 
46See Ibid., Articles 251-281: meanwhile renamed Court of 
Justice of the European Union. 
follow-on legislative measures.47 The treaties 
also provided these organs with extensive 
legal competences, which they then used to 
jointly extend the scope of EU law immensely 
– by drafting and enunciating what is 
commonly called “secondary EU law.” 
 
Secondary EU law is composed of 
Regulations, Directives, and Decisions.48 
Regulations are essentially laws on a 
European level: they are phrased in general 
terms and apply comprehensively, at least as 
far as indicated or expressly provided for by 
the Regulations themselves. The same 
qualification as law applies to Directives to 
some extent, namely as far as the required end 
result is concerned: each state is free, 
however, to reach that end result in whatever 
way it sees fit, prior to a given deadline. 
Finally, Decisions also provide binding law, 
but only upon those entities to which they are 
explicitly or implicitly directed. In each case, 
they would override, wherever applicable, 
national law or regulation to the contrary. 
 
At the same time, they are strictly legal 
instruments, designed and only to be used to 
implement and enforce higher-level policies, 
policy interests, and approaches as agreed by 
the EU with the Council, representing the 
interests of the individual member states, 
generally in a key role, not to develop and 
determine them. Not even the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the successor of the ill-fated effort to 
achieve a Constitution for Europe,49 which 
had been hailed as the first document 
providing the EU with formal competence in 
matters of space and space activities, was to 
fundamentally change this situation. In 
consequence, the Union still pools together the 
 
47Ibid., Articles 235-236: see Articles 13(1), 15, Treaty on 
European Union as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
48See Ibid., Article 288. 
49Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Rome, done 
29 October 2004 and not entered into force. 
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regulatory efforts of the member states for 
specific purposes indicated in the relevant 
treaties and essentially limited to those – even 
as it established its own distinct legal order; a 
sui generis-construction, which may be 
referred to as a supranational “half-way 
house” between an international organization 
and a federation-like structure. At present, 
twenty-seven European states50 have thus 
subjected themselves to a very extensive set of 
rights and obligations towards each other in 
the framework of the EU. As pointed out, this 
concerned a group of European states different 
from those interested in space and investing 
therein to become member of ESA. 
 
The European legal framework was initially 
built through signature and ratification of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
Treaty,51 the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EAEC) or Euratom Treaty,52 and 
the European Economic Community (EEC) 
Treaty53 all in the 1950s, as duly amended by 
subsequent treaties in later years. Such treaties 
included, in addition to the various accession 
treaties allowing for new member states to 
join the EC, then Union, the Single European 
Act of 1986,54 the Treaty on European Union 
of 1992,55 the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997,56 
                                                 
                                                
50The list of member states comprises: Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
51Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community, entered into force 23 July 1952. 
52Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community, entered into force 1 January 1958. 
53Treaty of Rome, or Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community (hereafter EEC Treaty), entered into 
force 1 January 1958. 
54Single European Act, entered into force 1 July 1987. One 
major result of the Single European Act was the integration of 
the main institutions of the Communities concerned, in 
particular the European Commission and the Council of 
Ministers. 
55Treaty on European Union, entered into force 1 November 
1993. 
the Treaty of Nice of 2001,57 and the Treaty of 
Lisbon of 2007. Of these, as we shall see for 
our space related topic, the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty of Lisbon are 
the most important. 
 
 
The European Union Legal Framework, 
Economic Activities, and Outer Space 
 
The essential elements of the Union’s legal 
order referred to above present the EU with its 
own measure of competencies and jurisdiction 
– over a wide range of economic or economy-
related activities. Depending upon certain 
circumstances and legal preconditions, they 
can be directly applied not only to the member 
states themselves, but also to private persons 
and entities resorting under the domestic 
jurisdictions of these member states. In 
addition, in a number of cases the rights and 
obligations directly applicable to individual 
citizens and legal entities can also be claimed 
directly by those entities. Bypassing domestic 
jurisdictions of member states, the Court of 
Justice can be called upon in a number of 
instances by those concerned to judge upon 
the legality of EU as well as national actions. 
The existence of this body central to the EU 
legal order represents an essential measure of 
supranational adjudication. 
 
As such, to what extent do the Union and its 
legal framework affect the space sector? 
Special as space is and distinct from and 
outside specific member state involvement, 
how would or could the EU expand such 
 
 
56Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European 
Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities 
and Certain Related Acts (hereafter Treaty of Amsterdam), 
entered into force 1 May 1999. 
57Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, 
the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and 
Certain Related Acts (hereafter Treaty of Nice), entered into 
force 1 February 2003. 
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impact to the extent considered necessary for 
the European greater common good? 
 
The answers to these questions lie in 
understanding how the aforementioned 
competencies and jurisdictions are applied to 
concrete issues – the application has to be 
made by explicit primary EU law, secondary 
EU law (much more common), or from EU 
law no other conclusion can be drawn other 
than such applicability was implied. This is 
captured by the notion of “subsidiarity,”58 
which means that unless the competence to 
legislate on a certain issue has unequivocally, 
even if only implicitly, been transferred to the 
Union’s organs the relevant power should still 
be deemed to rest with the national 
governmental authorities. If doubt arises 
whether an issue could be regulated more 
effectively and logically at the European level 
or at the national level, the presumption under 
subsidiarity is that the national level should 
prevail. 
 
In practice, only to the extent that space-
related activities are unequivocally covered by 
provisions in primary or secondary EU law, 
can any competence to legislate with respect 
to them be exercised by EU organs. Space 
activities, however, only constitute one among 
many topics from the Union’s perspective. 
Hence, they were hardly mentioned explicitly 
in primary EU law and not in any appreciable 
detail in secondary law. As we shall see, space 
has only recently achieved some presence and 
prominence in that context.59 Concomitantly, 
                                                 
 
t national 
gislation.64 
                                                
58Articles 5(1) and 5(3), Treaty on European Union as 
Amended by the Treaty of Lisbon. The latter thus extended the 
scope of application of the subsidiarity principle from the 
Community’s actions (where it applied since 1993 under 
Article 5, EC Treaty as amended by the Treaty on European 
Union) to all actions taken in the name of the Union. 
59For an excellent recent account of EU involvement in 
European space activities, see Imgard Marboe, “National 
Space Legislation: The European Perspective,” Nationales 
Weltraumrecht – National Space Law (2008), 31-46; Further, 
see Kevin Madders, A New Force at a New Frontier: 
EU competencies and jurisdiction have been 
generally acknowledged in the economic 
domain, applying to all economic activities 
proper, i.e., without overriding public 
interests, such as those relating to military, 
social, or cultural issues being behind those 
economic activities. Consequently, space 
activities do at least fall within the EU legal 
order to the extent that they may be 
considered economic activities. 
 
From such a perspective, the general 
application of EU law to economic activities is 
the main instrument for Union involvement in 
the space sector so far. Here, the central and 
most comprehensive aim of EU economic 
integration is the creation and maintenance of 
a common market.60 Effectively, the Internal 
Market, being one side of the common market, 
was established as of 1993 following the entry 
into force of the Treaty on European Union.61 
This regime, in turn, is based upon several 
freedoms: the freedoms of movement of 
goods, persons, services, and capital;62 an anti-
trust regime combating anti-competitive 
behavior of governments (state aid) and 
companies (collusive conduct and abuses of 
dominant positions) alike;63 and 
harmonization of relevan
le
 
Turning back to space activities from the 
perspective of how policies take shape within 
the EU, the Union’s organs, in particular the 
Commission, have over time obtained some 
freedom to draft, or at least prepare, European 
 
 
Europe’s Development in the Space Field of Its Main Actors, 
Policies, Law and Activities from its Beginnings up to the 
Present (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 566-584. 
60See Articles 3, 4(2.a), Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. 
61Articles 13-19, Single European Act. 
62See Articles 28-37, 45-66, Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. 
63See Ibid., Articles 101-109. 
64See Ibid., Articles 114-118. 
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policies, through such varying non-binding 
instruments as Resolutions, White Papers, and 
Green Papers.65 Yet, even with the 2007 EU-
ESA Space Policy the boundaries of that 
freedom are always those provided by the 
body of EU law, and the political will of the 
totality of EU member states to use their 
prerogatives, in particular through the 
Council, to allow any such policy initiative, to 
condition or control it, or even to obstruct it. 
Certainly, once a policy initiative is translated 
into new EU law, the Council of Ministers in 
its interplay with the Commission, the 
European Parliament, and the Court of Justice 
are able to control such a process to a large 
xtent.66 
 
European Union Involvement 
in Security Issues 
                                                
e
 
 
It should not be a surprise that as a 
consequence of the above discussion, at least 
until as recently as two decades ago, the 
European organs were given very little room 
to address military, defense, and security 
issues, whether specifically in terms of space 
or more generally speaking. Although the EC, 
then Union, as indicated originated in a 
 
t has changed to some extent, as we 
all see. 
European organ has cons
                                                
65The earliest such document relevant for space activities was 
“Towards Europe-wide systems and services” – Green Paper 
on a common approach in the field of satellite 
communications in the European Community, 
Communication from the Commission, COM(90) 490 final, 
of 20 November 1990. For further discussion of the 
development of an EU-driven space policy, see Gunther 
Verheugen, “Europe’s space plans and opportunities for 
cooperation,” Space Policy 21 (2005), 93-95; Thomas Reuter, 
“The Framework Agreement between the European Space 
Agency and the European Community: A Significant Step 
Forward?,” Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht 53 (2004), 
56-65; Kevin Madders and Walter Thiebaut, “Carpe diem: 
Europe must make a genuine space policy now,” Space Policy 
23 (2007): 7-12; and Nicolas Peter, “The EU’s emergent 
space diplomacy,” Space Policy 23 (2007): 97-107. 
66See Articles 293-294, Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, providing the basis for the complicated 
decision-making processes formally applicable to the 
development of EC law. 
completely different context and for rather 
different purposes than ESA, essentially the 
same limitations to EC/EU action in the field 
of security followed from the established aims 
of its activities and institutional structure. As 
to the former, the aims of the EC were 
summed up exhaustively in the 
aforementioned Article 2 of the EC Treaty, 
which throughout history has been updated to 
take into account new developments requiring 
a European-level competence – and so far had 
always excluded a reference to military, 
defense, and security issues. The only 
conclusion can be that this domain as a 
generic area has not yet been included within 
the EU competence.67 Only with the Treaty of 
Lisbon tha
sh
 
Even though the European Commission as a 
truly European organ has in principle the right 
to initiate policy and legislative developments, 
and the European Parliament as another truly 
iderable competence 
in both as well, at 
the end of the day 
this supranational 
competence only 
extends precisely to 
those domains 
falling within the 
EU sphere as 
determined, until 
very recently, by 
Article 2 of the EC 
Treaty. Extending 
the scope of that 
sphere in any 
formal sense 
requires the consent 
of the Council of Ministers representing the 
Coo
mili
take
still prefe
themse
security. 
peration on 
tary and 
security 
issues…does 
 place, but 
ultimately, 
Europe states 
rred to 
rely on 
lves for 
national 
 
67Note that the aforementioned subsidiarity principle 
specifically calls for either explicit or implicit (but then from 
a logical perspective irrefutable) transfer of competence to the 
EC/EU level, as argued on the basis of subsidiarity before 
such competence may be assumed. 
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member states, or in cases of fundamental 
enlargement of EU competence even new 
eaties. 
 rely on themselves for 
ational security. 
ace, and essentially by sheer 
ilitary force. 
inevitably 
uched upon the security domain. 
 
into the Space Security Arena 
 Criminal Matters (PJCCM) 
spectively).68 
Articles 10A through 28 of the Treaty on 
                                                
tr
 
From the perspective of security issues, the 
point of departure for European entities was 
the fundamental lack of reference to 
competencies in that area until fairly recently. 
Security being so closely related to questions 
of state sovereignty, the fact remains that in 
the last resort the sheer survival of the state as 
a relevant entity is at stake, and in spite of the 
long history of political, economic, social, and 
cultural integration since the Second World 
War European member states have not been 
willing to subject themselves in any 
fundamental sense to a supranational entity. 
Cooperation on military and security issues, 
and the conduct of joint military exercises 
does take place, but ultimately, Europe states 
still preferred to
n
 
Over the last two decades, however, partly as 
a consequence of the end of the Cold War, the 
demise of the Soviet Union, and the 
fundamental reshaping of the geopolitical 
landscape, the perspective on European 
security started to change. The undeniable 
success of the EU in economic terms –500 
million inhabitants constituting the largest 
single economic block in the world – 
strengthened European self-consciousness 
about a major role for Europe also in the 
geopolitical arena. At the same time, the lack 
of political and security-related coherence has 
become painfully clear, in particular in the 
context of the demise of Yugoslavia and the 
ensuing civil wars, where only NATO and the 
U.S. turned out to be able to restore some 
measure of pe
m
 
The ambitions of the EC thus started to 
address the involvement of Europe in such 
security domains, and it started to move 
carefully into that direction, and as it turned 
out in some respects taking ESA along to the 
extent these ambitions involved, or were 
focusing on, outer space and space activities. 
Essentially, the EC took a three-pronged, 
staged approach: firstly, by transforming itself 
formally into a EU; secondly, by starting to 
address in earnest the issue of international 
trade in security-sensitive goods and 
technology; and thirdly, by undertaking space 
projects jointly with ESA that 
to
 
European Union Entrance 
 
The renaming of the Community as the Union 
in-and-of-itself was an expression of the 
ambition of the member states, and of the 
European institutions, most prominently the 
Commission, to broaden European integration 
beyond the more economically-oriented 
domains. More to the point, the Treaty on 
European Union effectively did extend the 
scope of European integration as it had arisen 
on the basis of the three treaties of the 1950s, 
re-christening the EEC Treaty as the EC 
Treaty, and by adding two more “pillars” of 
the EU to the three Communities that had 
been merged into one Community (those 
pillars of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) and of Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in
re
 
Of course, it is the CFSP pillar, which 
concerns us here, established by means of 
 
68The first pillar was now that of the European Community, 
based not only the EC Treaty (Title II, Treaty on European 
Union), but also on the ECSC and EAEC Treaties (Titles III, 
resp. IV, Treaty on European Union). For the second, CFSP 
pillar, see Title V, Treaty on European Union; for the third, 
PJCCM pillar (originally labeled Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA)), see Title VI, Treaty on European Union. 
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European Union.69 This is where, with the 
entry into force of the Treaty on European 
Union in 1993, for the first time as far as the 
EC/EU framework was concerned, issues of 
security – the use of the words “defense” and 
“military” were still judiciously avoided – 
could be addressed. At least the word 
“security” is prominently present in the text 
now. 
 
The CFSP, however, is a straightforward 
intergovernmental construction and operates 
completely outside 
the established legal 
structure of the 
Union with its 
supranational 
features. There is at 
best a marginal role 
for the European 
Commission in its 
context as supposed 
guardian of the 
overarching 
European interest. 
For example, the 
Commission “may 
refer to the Council 
any question relating to the common foreign 
and security policy and may submit proposals 
to the Council” as well as request the 
convening of an extraordinary Council 
meeting.70 As a consequence of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the role of the Commission to “give 
its opinion particularly on whether the 
enhanced cooperation proposed [by EU 
member states] is consistent with Union 
policies”71 may have been relocated to the 
                                                                                                 
69Note that the Treaty of Lisbon amended also the Treaty on 
European Union, so that in the consolidated version of the 
latter as per 1 December 2009, Title V now comprises 
Articles 21-46. 
70Article 30(1), see also (2), Treaty on European Union as 
amended by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
71Article 27c, Treaty on European Union, as inserted by the 
Treaty of Nice. 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union; it was not changed fundamentally.72 
Yet in principle, “Decisions under this Title 
shall be taken by the Council acting 
unanimously” and there is no formal 
entitlement for the Commission to anything 
other than being kept informed and allowed to 
offer its opinion.73 
 
As a result, there also was no role for the 
elaborate legislative, adjudicative, and 
enforcement jurisdiction of the European 
Parliament or the Court of Justice, which was 
developed in the context of the EC Treaty. 
The European Parliament, for instance, can 
make itself heard on similar terms as the 
Commission, but does not have any formal 
say in the outcome of whatever legally 
binding decisions would result from the 
deliberation process. Even post-Lisbon, the 
cooperation under the CFSP is essentially 
cooperation between the member states with 
the Commission in an unofficial mediating 
role except where the existing acquis 
communautaire (the total body of EU law 
accumulated thus far) is threatened. Those 
issues remain exclusively reserved for national 
governments to deal with as they see fit to the 
extent beyond having allowed for such 
concepts as the European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP), now Common 
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), and EU 
Battle Groups to be developed.74 
…gradually, the 
European 
institutions…as 
compared to the 
group of 
sovereign states 
making up EU 
membership, are 
involving 
themselves in 
issues of 
security… 
 
As referred to before, security at the European 
level has had distinct historical roots. To start, 
international cooperation in the areas of 
defense and security had always been dealt 
 
72See Article 329(2), Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. 
73Article 31(1), Treaty on European Union as Amended by 
the Treaty of Lisbon. 
74See Articles 326-334, Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. For example, the CSDP is the domain of the 
Council of the European Union, representing the member 
states under the Lisbon Treaty, not the European Commission. 
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with in the context of NATO or the WEU. As 
a consequence of the shifting paradigms, the 
WEU is now being integrated into the EU 
structures as part of the intergovernmental 
CFSP. That integration turns out to be a slow 
process. It started in 1999 with a first level of 
integration of WEU functions into the EU 
framework, and has meanwhile led to the 
handing over of the WEU satellite center at 
Torrejon, Spain to become the EU Satellite 
Center, jointly with a European Institute of 
Security Studies in 2002. Yet these transfers 
have not been finalized – and some doubt 
whether such integration will be ever 
complete.75 The integration described here 
does not ipso facto subsume the WEU within 
the EU’s institutional structures. 
 
Prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, the Treaty on 
European Union referred to the role of the 
WEU in somewhat ambiguous terms. Security 
policies in the context of the CFSP pillar 
“shall not prevent the development of closer 
cooperation between two or more Member 
States on a bilateral level, in the framework of 
the Western European Union (WEU) and 
NATO, provided such cooperation does not 
run counter to or impede that provided for” 
through the CFSP.76 The clauses that have 
replaced this one as per the Treaty of Lisbon 
do not mention the WEU in any specific terms 
and as a consequence of dealing with 
essentially the same subject matter might be 
argued to have effectively emptied the WEU 
of all meaning. Yet any implementation 
thereof still hinges crucially on member state 
agreement to any substantive implementation 
of the common and foreign security policy in 
                                                 
                                                75See Ralph Folsom, Principles of European Union Law 
(2005), 25. Formally, the WEU still is its own 
intergovernmental self, though now essentially dormant; the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon has not yet led to 
decisions to disband the WEU. 
76Article 17, Treaty on European Union as Amended by the 
Treaty of Nice. 
the specific military domain, the erstwhile 
main focus of the WEU.77 
 
In short, in this institutional domain of 
European involvement in space security, 
slowly but gradually, the European institutions 
properly speaking, as compared to the group 
of sovereign states making up EU 
membership, are involving themselves in 
issues of security in a broad sense. It seems 
inevitable that this process increasingly will 
also involve more clearly outlined military 
and defense issues. 
 
 
The European Union 
and the Trade Aspects of Security 
 
The second inroad the Union started to make 
into the realm of security concerns the risks 
inherent in today’s voluminous global trade 
relations. These risks deal with proliferation of 
security-sensitive dual-use goods, technology, 
and know-how to states or non-state entities 
that would result in harming European 
interests. 
 
In a sense, this was the most logical and 
obvious starting point for the 
Community/Union to get involved with the 
security domain, as international trade and the 
potentially trade-distorting impact thereof on 
the EC Internal Market had belonged to the 
EC’s competencies for a considerable time. 
And indeed, already long before the 
establishment of the EU and the CFSP pillar, 
the Community had drafted a first legislative 
document on export controls, the 1969 
Regulation 2603/69.78 
 
 
77See Articles 42 and forward, Treaty on European Union as 
Amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, inter alia also providing 
for an (in legal terms equally limited) role of the European 
Defense Agency. 
78Regulation of the Council establishing common rules for 
exports, (EEC) No. 2603/69, of 20 December 1969. 
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These developments were given a 
considerable boost by several developments in 
the 1990s. First, there was the aforementioned 
creation of the Union and the CFSP – leading 
to such further EC law as Regulation 
3381/9479 and Decision 94/942/CFSP80 
drafted under the Treaty on European Union, 
even as these documents were far from 
comprehensive in scope. Second, the changing 
geopolitical landscape caused the 
aforementioned CoCom/MTCR-regime81 to be 
widened in scope, most notably leading to the 
establishment of the Wassenaar 
Arrangement82 encompassing all dual-use 
sensitive technologies and related products 
and know-how in the mid-1990s. Third, the 
limited progress, as compared to the ambitions 
of the then-Commission, of development of 
European security policy, including but not 
limited to space, in terms of a European Space 
Strategy on the basis of the CFSP made the 
European institutions more aware of the 
limited areas where progress could more 
easily and readily be expected, namely 
international security and international trade. 
 
The result was of all this was Regulation 
1334/200083 providing a baseline framework 
for implementing in a binding European 
context the international obligations resulting 
                                                 
oods.85 
instruments of EC law,86 but still remains the 
79Council Regulation setting up a Community regime for the 
control of exports of dual-use goods, No. 3381/94/EC, of 19 
December 1994. 
80Council Decision on the joint action adopted by the Council 
of the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union 
concerning the control of exports of dual-use goods, 
94/942/CFSP, of 19 December 1994. 
81Currently, 19 out of the 27 EU member states – Cyprus, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia are missing – are participating in the MTCR. 
82Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for 
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies 
(hereafter Wassenaar Arrangement), effective 12 July 1996. 
Currently, 26 out of the 27 EU member states – only Cyprus 
is missing – as well as all 18 ESA member states are 
participating in the Arrangement. 
83Council Regulation setting up a Community regime for the 
control of exports of dual-use items and technology, No. 
1334/2000/EC, of 22 June 2000. 
from the formally non-binding MTCR and 
Wassenaar regimes, while working towards a 
harmonization of the ways and means by 
which individual member states would 
implement and apply those international 
obligations and guidelines.84 As the 
Regulation itself phrases it: its aims are to 
develop an “effective common system of 
export controls on dual-use items [which] is 
necessary to ensure... the international 
commitments and responsibilities of the 
Member States, especially regarding non-
proliferation, and of the European Union,” 
through “a common control system and 
harmonized policies for enforcement and 
monitoring” as “a prerequisite for establishing 
the free movement of dual-use items inside the 
Community” – the most fundamental 
justification for EU institutions to address the 
issue of international trade in dual-use 
g
 
The Regulation itself has been amended on 
average almost once a year since by later 
                                                 
84An extended analysis of Regulation 1334/2000 and the 
framework built upon it can be found in Frans von der Dunk, 
“A European “Equivalent” to United States Export Controls: 
European Law on the Control of International Trade in Dual-
hs (2), (3), Preamble, Regulation 1334/2000, 
 
Use Space Technologies,” Astropolitics 7 (2009): 110-124. 
85See Paragrap
and Article 1. 
86This concerns Council Regulation amending Regulation 
(EC) No. 1334/2000 with regard to intra-Community transfers 
and exports of dual-use items and technology, No. 
2889/2000/EC, of 22 December 2000; Council Regulation 
amending Regulation (EC) No. 1334/2000 with regard to the 
list of controlled dual-use items and technology when 
exported, No. 458/2001/EC, of 6 March 2001; Council 
Regulation amending and updating Regulation (EC) No. 
1334/2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of 
exports of dual-use items and technology, No. 2432/2001/EC, 
of 20 November 2001; Council Regulation amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 setting up a Community 
regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and 
technology, No. 880/2002/EC, of 27 May 2002; Council 
Regulation amending and updating Regulation (EC) No 
1334/2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of 
exports of dual-use items and technology, No. 149/2003/EC, 
of 27 January 2003; Council Regulation amending and 
updating Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 setting up a 
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key document in the present context. Its main 
body provides for the basic regime whereas 
the Annexes, through their regular updates, 
take account of new developments regarding 
the subject matter itself as following inter alia 
from the Wassenaar Arrangement updates. In 
particular, Annex I entitled “List of Dual-Use 
Items and Technology,” and thereby listing all 
items subject to the regime created by the 
Regulation, was amended time and again to 
keep track of ongoing technical, practical, and 
political developments.87 
 
Dual-use items as covered by the Regulation’s 
regime are broadly defined as all “items, 
including software and technology, which can 
be used for both civil and military purposes,”88 
whereas export comprises normal export of 
goods, but extends to “transmission of 
software or technology by electronic media, 
fax, or telephone to a destination outside the 
Community,”89 and “exporter” is equally 
broadly defined.90 Since such a definition of 
dual-use items clearly could encompass more 
or less all space technology, the broad sweep 
ratione materiae of the European regime in 
terms of space activities becomes clear 
immediately. 
 
                                                 
 
Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use 
                                                
items and technology, No. 1504/2004/EC, of 19 July 2004; 
Council Regulation amending and updating Regulation (EC) 
No 1334/2000 setting up a Community regime for the control 
of exports of dual-use items and technology, No. 
394/2006/EC, of 27 February 2006; Council Regulation 
amending and updating Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 
setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of 
dual-use items and technology, No. 1183/2007/EC, of 18 
September 2007; and Council Regulation amending and 
updating Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 setting up a 
Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use 
items and technology, No. 1167/2008/EC, of 24 October 
2008. 
87Annex I, Regulation 1167/2008; further see Article 3, 
Regulation 1334/2000. 
88Article 2(a), Regulation 1334/2000. 
89Ibid., Article 2(b), sub-paragraph (iii). 
90See Ibid., Article 2(c). 
Technology itself is also defined in such broad 
terms, albeit not in the main body of the 
Regulation itself, but by Annex I: “specific 
information necessary for the ‘development,’ 
‘production,’ or ‘use’ of goods” further 
elaborated in that “this information takes the 
form of ‘technical data’ or ‘technical 
assistance,’” whereby the latter “may take 
forms, such as instructions, skills, training, 
working knowledge, and consulting services 
and may involve the transfer of ‘technical 
data,’” and these may in turn “take forms, 
such as blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, 
formulae, tables, engineering designs and 
specifications, manuals and instructions 
written or recorded on other media, or devices, 
such as disk, tape, read-only memories.”91 
 
The core element of the regime developed on 
the basis of the Regulation concerns the 
authorization process and procedures, which 
remains a prerogative of the EU member 
states, but should conform to the parameters 
as provided by the Regulation’s regime. The 
point of departure, in any event, still is 
national authorization. 
 
Firstly, such an authorization is required for 
export of the dual-use items as defined and 
listed in Annex I.92 Secondly, the obligations 
of a prospective exporter are not limited to 
screening an exhaustive list and then abiding 
by its terms, as there are scenarios under 
which an exporter would be obliged to comply 
with the control and authorization mechanisms 
provided by the Regulation, also where the 
items concerned as such are not listed in 
Annex I.93 
 
 
91Annex I, Regulation 1167/2008. 
92See Article 3(1), Regulation 1334/2000; and introductory 
paragraph, Annex I – List of Dual-Use Items and Technology, 
Regulation 1167/2008. 
93The three scenarios concern: (1) potential involvement of 
the item concerned in the context of weapons of mass 
destruction; (2) export to a state subject to an arms embargo 
imposed by the European Union, the Organization for 
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As national sovereignty of member states is 
still the baseline, the Regulation does not take 
away the possibility for a prospective exporter 
to be confronted with requirements for 
authorizations imposed by member states 
under national laws and regulations outside of 
the system of the Regulation properly 
speaking.94 In such cases, the Regulation only 
imposes upon the member state adopting or 
maintaining relevant legislation a duty to 
inform other member states as well as the 
Commission.95 
 
With regard to these national authorization 
regimes, the Regulation only further imposes 
the requirement that they should allow for 
three types of authorizations: individual, 
global, or general, with the latter being valid 
throughout the Community.96 While leaving 
the choice to the national member state 
authorities regarding which type of 
authorization to use in a certain case, a few 
specific limits are imposed by the Regulation 
in that regard.97 
 
Next to that, as the cornerstone of actual 
harmonization, the Regulation introduces the 
concept of the Community General Export 
Authorization (CGEA).98 The CGEA 
explicitly constitutes an exception to the 
sovereign discretion of member states as for 
all items not covered by it; any authorization 
                                                 
 
                                                
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the United 
Nations Security Council; and (3) export without national 
authorization or in violation of a national authorization; see 
Articles 3(2), 4(1), (2), (3), and (4), Regulation 1334/2000. 
94Article 4(5), Regulation 1334/2000. 
95See Ibid., Article 4(6). 
96See Ibid., Article 6(2). 
97See further Frans von der Dunk, “A European “Equivalent” 
to United States Export Controls: European Law on the 
Control of International Trade in Dual-Use Space 
Technologies,” Astropolitics 7 (2009): 122-4. 
98See Article 6(1), Regulation 1334/2000. 
shall be granted – or refused – by the member 
state where the exporter is located.99 
 
The CGEA’s scope is essentially limited in 
three ways. One, ratione materiae only items 
as defined by Annex II – with the exception 
moreover of those mentioned in Part 2 thereof 
– require a CGEA as opposed to a national 
authorization, which still covers the bulk of 
items listed in Annex I.100 Two, however, 
ratione personae the CGEA covers such 
exports only to the extent the target 
destination is Australia, Canada, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, or the U.S.101 
Three, further exceptions to applicability of 
the CGEA occur in more limited scenarios.102 
 
Thus, Regulation 1334/2000 in conjunction 
with follow-up Regulations created a complex 
interlocking system of European-wide and 
national authorizations. That system required 
European-wide authorizations instead of 
national ones in varying measures for the 
export of the items listed in a few interlocking 
Annexes to other EU member states, a limited 
set of close political allies of other states and 
destinations, otherwise leaving the individual 
sovereign discretion of the member states 
intact. 
 
Nevertheless, presenting a kind of European 
equivalent to U.S. export controls, the 
Regulation and the regime built upon it 
 
99Ibid., Article 6(2). 
100See Annex II, Regulation 1167/2008; Part 1 of Annex II 
simply provides in full “This export authorization covers the 
following items: All dual-use specified in any entry in Annex 
I of the present Regulation except those listed in Part 2 
below.” 
101See Ibid., Part 3. 
102See Ibid., Articles 1, 2, and 3, Annex II. These three 
scenarios concern: (1) (once again):  potential involvement of 
the item concerned in the context of weapons of mass 
destruction; (2) (once again) export to a state subject to an 
arms embargo imposed by the European Union, the OSCE, or 
the United National Security Council; and (3) where the 
relevant items are to be exported to a destination within a 
customs free zone or free warehouse. 
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represents a careful, detailed, and politically 
noteworthy foray of the EU into the security 
domain, including space security in view of 
the inherent dual-use of most space activities, 
hardware, and technology. The establishment 
of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 
2004103 may also turn out to contribute to 
further fundamental EU inroads in legal and 
political terms in the European security 
domain, albeit that Agency falls under the 
competencies specifically of the Council of 
the European Union, not of the Commission. 
 
As with the development of the CFSP pillar, 
this development took place without the 
involvement of ESA – although ESA’s role in 
the European space endeavour under the 
Regulation’s regime was recognized to the 
extent that export controls on launchers and 
launch-related items otherwise applicable 
would essentially be waived for items “that 
are transferred on the basis of orders pursuant 
to a contractual relationship placed by the 
European Space Agency (ESA) or that are 
transferred by ESA to accomplish its official 
tasks” or “that are transferred to a State-
controlled space launching site in the territory 
of a Member State, unless that Member State 
controls such transfers within the terms of this 
Regulation” – noting here that European 
launches usually take place from Kourou, 
French Guyana, which is French territory.104 
 
 
European Union - European Space 
Agency Cooperation 
 
The most recent angle from which the EU, this 
time in close cooperation with ESA, was 
venturing into the space domain, was the 
                                                 
                                                
103See Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004 
on the establishment of the European Defense Agency; also, 
see Article 42(3), Treaty on European Union as Amended by 
the Treaty of Lisbon. 
104Part I, Annex IV, Regulation 1167/2008, sub-paragraph (1) 
resp. (4). 
development of two European “flagship 
projects,” Galileo and GMES. Both concerned 
major programs aiming at launching and 
operating a system of satellites as the core part 
of an infrastructure to be used for practical 
downstream terrestrial applications. It may be 
added that perhaps soon a third project is to 
follow, i.e., the joint development of European 
SSA capabilities, which will also have a 
substantial, and probably even more profound 
impact on security issues in space for Europe. 
 
Galileo, initiated by the European 
Commission, is the second-generation, 
European-owned and European-operated 
global satellite navigation system currently 
being developed to be operational by 2013.105 
Its key features, as compared with the 
currently operational satellite navigation 
systems, the U.S. Global Positioning System 
(GPS) and the Russian GLONASS (Global 
Navigation Satellite System), have been listed 
as being an internationally-operated system 
controlled by civilians and providing for 27, 
plus three spare, satellites in medium Earth 
orbits (MEO). The satellite signals should be 
augmented world-wide and should be 
 
105Council Resolution on the European Contribution to the 
Development of a Global Navigation Satellite System 
(GNSS), of 19 December 1994; Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – 
Towards a Trans-European Positioning and Navigation 
Network: including A European Strategy for Global 
Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), COM(1998) 29 final, 
of 21 January 1998; Galileo – Involving Europe in a New 
Generation of Satellite Navigation Services, of 10 February 
1999, COM(1999) 54 final; Council Resolution on the 
involvement of Europe in a new generation of satellite 
navigation services – Galileo-Definition phase, of 19 July 
1999; Commission Communication to the European 
Parliament and the Council – On GALILEO, of 22 November 
2000, COM(2000) 750 final; Council Regulation setting up 
the Galileo Joint Undertaking, No. 876/2002/EC, of 21 May 
2002; Council Regulation on the establishment of structures 
for the management of the European satellite radio-navigation 
programs, No. 1321/2004/EC, of 12 July 2004; and 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the further implementation of the European satellite 
navigation programs (EGNOS and Galileo); No. 
683/2008/EC, of 9 July 2008. 
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available in principle for usage by many 
transport as well as non-transport applications. 
These satellites should furthermore provide, 
apart from an Open Service similar to GPS 
and GLONASS Open Services, three types of 
enhanced services, for which users one way or 
another would have to pay, of which the 
Public Regulated Service (PRS) is of 
importance for the current discussion, plus 
search and rescue services additional to the 
existing COSPAS-SARSAT Program 
[International Satellite System for Search and 
Rescue].106 
 
Galileo has undergone various delays and a 
number of changes of direction over the last 
years, most notably discarding for the time 
being the Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
approach in financing, building, and operating 
the system. The EU Council of Ministers by 
means of a Resolution of 8 June 2007 
unequivocally concludes in this regard “that 
the current concession negotiations have failed 
and should be ended.”107 However, the 
Resolution, as well as ensuing political 
discussions within Europe at the highest level, 
left little doubt that the European stakeholders 
are determined to make Galileo happen and to 
replace the private investments that are now 
no longer expected with public investments 
one way or another; indeed, public investment 
has been achieved through the transfer of 
unused Common Agricultural Funds.108 The 
most recent result of that determination so far 
                                                                                                 
106The COSPAS-SARSAT currently is a four-state satellite 
system available to aircraft, ships, other vehicles, and persons 
in distress for the purpose of sending emergency signals and 
alerting rescue services; see International COSPAS-SARSAT 
Program Agreement, entered into force on 30 August 1988. 
107Item 2, Council Resolution on GALILEO, 2805th Transport, 
Telecommunications, and Energy Council Meeting, 
Luxembourg, 6-8 June 2007. 
108Items 4-7, Council Resolution on GALILEO, 2805th 
Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council Meeting, 
Luxembourg, 6-8 June 2007; respectively Council of the 
European Union, 2828th Council Meeting, Economic, and 
Financial Affairs, Brussels, 13 November 2007, 14534/07 
(Presse 251), at 18. 
has been Regulation 683/2008 on the further 
implementation of EGNOS (the regional 
forerunner to Galileo currently operational) 
and Galileo itself. By now, two test satellites 
are operational: the GIOVE-A, built by Surrey 
Satellite Technology, launched December 
2005, and the GIOVE-B, built by Galileo 
Industries and launched April 2008.109 
 
From several perspectives, including the 
geopolitical one, Galileo is a major success 
already prior to its proper deployment. Ever 
since the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
became the first non-European partner to join 
the project at the highest level,110 many such 
states have expressed their interest in doing so 
and some concluded similar agreements.111 
Though, with the transition from the Galileo 
Joint Undertaking (GJU) to the European 
GNSS [Global Navigation Satellite System] 
Supervisory Authority, as well as the funding 
problems, these cooperative developments 
have largely stalled, in the case of the PRC 
even leading to a severe curtailing of the 
actual level of cooperation.112 
 
Such involvement of non-EU, largely non-
European, countries had for the first time 
raised major issues related to European 
security issues, which the Commission had to 
cope with. Notably, the Cooperation 
Agreement with the PRC specifically did not 
 
109The first four in-orbit validation phase satellites for Galileo 
are planned for launch by November 2010. 
110By becoming a member of the Galileo Joint Undertaking 
(GJU), the precursor to the European GNSS Supervisory 
Authority (GSA); see Cooperation Agreement on a Civil 
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) – Galileo 
between the European Community and its Member States and 
the People’s Republic of China, of 30 October 2003; Doc. 
Council of the European Union, 13324/03. 
111For example; see Cooperation Agreement on a Civil Global 
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) between the European 
Community and its Member States and the State of Israel, of 2 
June 2005. 
112Space News 12 June 2006. 
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include access by the PRC to the PRS.113 The 
PRS is the Galileo-service most akin to the 
GPS Precise Positioning Signal. PRS will be 
encrypted and physically protected, and only 
accessible to a limited group of users – in 
principle all governmental organs, some 
hybrid service providers in areas key to 
modern society, and also in terms of security, 
such as energy and telecommunications 
networks. 
 
Also, the Agreement with the PRC touched 
upon the issue of export control of security-
sensitive space hardware and technology in 
the context of Galileo cooperation. It notably 
provided that “Exports by China to third 
countries of sensitive items related to the 
Galileo program will have to be submitted for 
prior authorization by the competent Galileo 
security authority, if the authority has 
recommended to the EU Member States that 
these items be subject to export 
authorization.”114 In any event, parties 
reserved the right to apply applicable laws and 
regulations in the context of EU-PRC 
cooperation on Galileo as a safety precaution 
in case key security issues would be perceived 
to be at stake.115 Regulation 683/2008, the 
currently ruling legal document on Galileo, 
provides on this issue that any additional 
contributions by member states, third states, or 
intergovernmental organizations can only be 
arranged subject to dedicated agreements, 
allowing a similar degree of control over 
security matters.116 
 
Being developed under EU leadership, with 
ESA as developer and procuring agency, the 
                                                 
                                                
113On the other hand, see Article 4(2), Cooperation 
Agreement on a Civil Global Navigation Satellite System 
(GNSS) – Galileo between the European Community and its 
Member States and the People’s Republic of China. 
114Ibid., Article 8(4).  
115Ibid., Article 5(1). 
116See Articles 4(4), (5), and 6(3) and (4), Regulation 
683/2008. 
Regulation further outlines the envisaged 
approach to Galileo, including the system of 
governance that should apply to the 
operational phase. Important for our current 
topic is that the European GNSS Supervisory 
Authority, established by Regulation 
1321/2004, is to fulfill the key role inter alia 
in security accreditation and operation of the 
Galileo security center.117 In this respect, the 
Supervisory Authority will operate under the 
umbrella of the Commission, which takes it 
upon itself to “manage all questions relating to 
the security of the systems, duly taking into 
account the need for oversight and integration 
of security requirements in the overall 
programs.”118 
 
As already has become clear, and in spite of 
the civil governance structure to be developed 
for Galileo, security issues will have to be 
faced. Firstly, the possibility of potential 
adversary use of its signals would still have to 
be dealt with; someone has to take decisions, 
in the worst case, to effectively shut down 
parts of the system, when Galileo signals 
threaten to be used by states or non-state 
actors against the security interests of Europe 
and European states.119 
 
Secondly, as referred to before, the envisaged 
PRS, while painstakingly avoiding any 
reference to military or defense, was modeled 
in many respects on the GPS Precise 
Positioning Signal. Whilst the PRS is 
officially to be made accessible to all 
 
117See Article 16, Regulation 683/2008. 
118Ibid., Article 13(1). See further Article 13(2)-(5), as well as 
Article 14 on the general governance of Galileo for security 
purposes. 
119This was essentially taken care of by involving a “Galileo 
security center” in the overall governance scheme for the 
Galileo system, as well as specific security-related 
regulations; see 16th preamble paragraph, Articles 7, 13, 14, 
and 16, Regulation 683/2008; also see Council Joint Action 
on aspects of the operation of the European satellite radio-
navigation system affecting the security of the European 
Union, 2004/552/CFSP, of 12 July 2004. 
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governmental services, debate has already 
arisen about whether such governmental uses 
should not also include the use by the military 
of respective member states. To those familiar 
with Western political history over the last 
half century, it will come as no surprise that 
France is most adamant in seeing no obstacle 
to such use, whereas the United Kingdom, at 
least until recently, was most adamant in 
emphasizing that such military uses were 
never contemplated, and should not be 
contemplated, or at least be vigorously 
pursued, now. 
 
The other flagship project, GMES, is of more 
recent date, and consequently has not yet 
evolved to such an extent as Galileo, in 
particular, as relevant to the present 
discussion, in terms of an attendant legal and 
governance framework to handle to security 
aspects.120 At the same time, it now seems 
certain, with the launch of the Sentinel 1 
satellite for GMES scheduled for 2011 (the 
first Earth observation satellite for GMES) 
that it will actually precede an operational 
Galileo system to space. GMES is to become 
the pan-European contribution to the Global 
Earth Observation System of Systems 
(GEOSS), representing a global effort to 
enhance environmental protection with the 
help of satellite technology. 
 
Nonetheless, GMES represents the next step 
for space security issues in Europe since this 
project for the first time did prominently refer 
to the concept of security – interestingly, in 
the process extending its scope, as GMES was 
originally meant to stand for Global 
Monitoring for Environmental Security, 
                                                 
                                                
120See further Council Resolution on the launch of the initial 
period of global monitoring for environment and security 
(GMES), of 13 November 2001; Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – 
Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES): 
Establishing a GMES capacity by 2008, COM(2004) 65 final, 
of 3 February 2004. 
before the latter part was changed to 
Environment and Security. Security as 
understood here gradually came to be 
interpreted beyond the concept of “civil 
security” so as to encompass more 
“traditional” military and defense issues of 
security.121 
 
GMES, being tasked to provide Europe with 
its own independent and comprehensive 
satellite Earth observation infrastructure for 
generation of data and information on a 
comprehensive range of subjects, will bring 
the inclusion of defense, security, and military 
matters into the broader civil European 
governance structures. Like Galileo, this 
impacts both the EU and ESA in terms of their 
traditional domain having explicitly excluded 
military, defense, and security issues. 
Establishment of a coherent SSA flagship 
project will no doubt move such developments 
one step further again. 
 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon 
 
The developments regarding the increasing 
involvement of the EU in the space security 
domain are converging with the latest 
European achievement, which is the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon as of 1 
December 2009. The increasing growth of the 
Union – adding twelve new member states in 
the time span of a mere three years (2004-
2007) – was calling for a further 
rationalization of the governance structure, 
where a Commission having at least one 
Commissioner of every member state and the 
possibilities for small numbers of member 
states to block legislative development in the 
Council were threatening to make further 
 
121See further on this Frans von der Dunk, “A European 
“Equivalent” to United States Export Controls: European Law 
on the Control of International Trade in Dual-Use Space 
Technologies,” Astropolitics 7 (2009). 
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progress of the Union as a whole increasingly 
difficult. Also, the calls for more involvement 
at a European level in global issues of 
sustainable development, poverty, climate 
change, and last, but not least, the new 
security issues and a consequent revival of 
ideas to extend the scope of supranational 
policy-making and law-making did not go 
unheard. 
 
As mentioned, the first effort after the Treaty 
of Nice of 2001 to take a step forward in 
European integration was the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe agreed 
upon in Rome in 2004 – but this effort failed. 
This was not in the least because the inclusion 
of the word “Constitution,” and its presumed 
corollaries of a “European anthem” and an 
official “European flag” as symbols of the 
perceived ambition to create a European 
“super-state” with certain democratic lacunae, 
triggered nationalist sentiments sufficiently to 
make the treaty fail in the referenda held in 
France and the Netherlands. An additional 
factor blocking the required EU-wide 
acceptance was the rather unwieldy and 
“juridical-technical” nature of the document 
that the combination of the various updating 
treaties with particular the original EC Treaty 
had become. 
 
While the Treaty of Lisbon, to many a scaled-
down and more realistic version of the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe, took 
close to two years between acceptance of the 
final text and entry into force,122 in the end it 
did succeed in becoming the key document 
                                                 
                                                
122The Treaty of Lisbon was voted down in Ireland by a 
referendum the first time around, and managed a favorable 
vote the second time only after considerable wheeling and 
dealing and a number of cosmetic changes; and even after the 
Treaty had passed that hurdle, in particular Poland and the 
Czech Republic were serious candidates to block the entry 
into force of the Treaty – acceptance of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
as of any other fundamental treaty in the EC and EU context, 
had to be unanimous as between the twenty-seven member 
states in order to lead to entry into force. 
underlying the European Union. Among many 
other things, it also tried to further enhance the 
position of Europe as an entity in its own right 
in space and security, and consequently the 
space security domain. 
 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon and Security 
 
As far as the security-side to the equation is 
concerned, at least the principle of “security” 
was partially transferred from the Treaty on 
European Union to the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, and 
included a reference to “defense” at the same 
time. The first treaty was the one document 
part of the Treaty of Lisbon where the EC 
legal order and the key roles of Commission, 
Parliament, and Court were not engaged; the 
other, effectively the old EC Treaty as 
amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, was the 
second such document where EC law and 
Commission, Parliament, and Court 
competencies did apply. 
 
So, in matters of security, now “The Union 
shall have competence, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Treaty on European Union, 
to define and implement a common foreign 
and security policy, including the progressive 
framing of a common defense policy.”123 
However, the actual implementation of such 
policies refers back to the Treaty on European 
Union, to wit its second pillar where the 
intergovernmental structures reside. Also, 
Article 4 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union makes reference to shared 
competence between the Union and EU 
member states in the “area of freedom, 
security, and justice.”124 Note, that “security” 
is inserted in the text between “freedom” and 
“justice,” whereby the term “security” may 
 
123Article 2(4), Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. 
124Ibid., Article 4(2.j). 
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arguably be somewhat confined to civil 
security. 
 
What the actual effect will be of this partial 
“transfer” of the security domain into the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, will depend on the future usage that 
the Union’s institutions may seek to make of 
these clauses. On one hand, the shared 
competence of Article 4(2) essentially means 
that “the member states can in principle only 
exercise their competences to the extent that 
the Union has not exercised its competence,125 
which in turn means the Union’s institutions 
can, following Article 288 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, adopt 
Regulations, Directives, and Decisions. 
 
On the other hand, Article 2(4) ensures that 
any action of the Union in this domain will 
have to follow the rules of the Treaty on 
European Union in its version as consolidated 
by the Treaty of Lisbon. Here, the Union may 
now “define and pursue common policies and 
actions” among others to “safeguard its 
values, fundamental interests, security, 
independence and integrity; … preserve 
peace, prevent conflicts, and strengthen 
international security in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations 
Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki 
Final Act, and with the aims of the Charter of 
Paris, including those relating to external 
borders,” objects clearly at least potentially 
involving security, including military 
decisions.126 To what extent such policies and 
actions may comprise juridical or legislative 
action, and also to what extent such policies 
would essentially remain an empty shell 
                                                 
                                                125Stephen Hobe, et al, A New Chapter for Europe in Space,” 
Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht I: 54 (2005), 347. 
126Article 21(2), Treaty on European Union as amended by 
the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union 
and the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
(hereafter Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European 
Union), Lisbon, entered into force 1 December 2009. 
without actual follow-on juridical or 
legislative action, may be disputed, but in 
principle these would not be subject to the 
democratic controls of the European 
Parliament, and therefore remain within the 
exclusive domain of democratic controls of 
relevant national parliaments, and by the same 
token would fall outside the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Justice. 
 
Furthermore, it is the European Council, a 
special version of the Council of Ministers 
comprising the Heads of State of the member 
states, hence still first and foremost 
representing their individual member states’ 
interests,127 which shall now, further to Article 
21 of the consolidated Treaty on European 
Union, identify the 
strategic interests and 
objectives of the 
Union and take 
relevant decisions by 
unanimity, inter alia 
in the area of 
common foreign and 
security policy.128 
The role of the 
Commission is 
limited to the right to 
propose external 
actions other than 
those for the area of 
common foreign and 
security policy, which is the domain of the 
occupant of the newly created High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, a special official which is, 
although Vice-President of the Commission, 
directly appointed by the European Council.129 
…at least the 
principle of 
“security” was 
partially 
transferred from 
the Treaty on 
European 
Union to the 
Treaty on the 
Functioning of 
the European 
Union…
 
 
127See further Articles 235-236, Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union. 
128See Article 22(1), Consolidated Version of the Treaty on 
European Union. 
129See Ibid., Articles 18(1) and (2), and 22(2); further Article 
30. 
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Article 24(1) of the consolidated version of the 
Treaty on European Union echoes the 
aforementioned provision of Article 2(4) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, in allotting to the Union “all areas of 
foreign policy and all questions relating to the 
Union’s security, including the progressive 
framing of a common defense policy.” This 
common foreign security policy, however, is 
subject to specific rules and procedures, 
requiring unanimous agreement by the 
European Council and alternatively the 
Council of Ministers, but “the adoption of 
legislative acts shall be excluded” and (with 
one exception not relevant here) “the Court of 
Justice of the European Union shall not have 
jurisdiction with respect to these 
provisions.”130 
 
In sum, in all of Title V of the consolidated 
version of the Treaty on European Union, 
entitled “General Provisions on the Union’s 
External Action and Specific Provisions on 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy” 
and comprising Articles 21 through 46, the 
Commission is referred to no more than eight 
times, in a manner that can be described as 
being on the fringe of the actual decision-
making processes. From the same perspective, 
the European Parliament is referred to a mere 
seven times, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union exactly once. By contrast, the 
European Council has been mentioned 19 
times, the Council of Ministers as such no less 
than 74 times, and the term “Member States” 
occurs 58 times in this Title. There is no better 
way to directly visualize the different roles of 
the first three, the “truly European 
institutions,” as compared with the latter two 
institutions where the individual member 
states’ interests are most prominently 
defended, in the context of security under the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
 
                                                 
                                                
130Ibid., Article 24(1). See further Articles 28 and 31. 
It remains to be seen how the political 
landscape, both within the European Union 
itself and from a more geopolitical 
perspective, will evolve and whether this 
might, under certain circumstances, allow for 
an increasingly larger role for the EU 
institutions in security issues. 
 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon and Space 
 
In regard to outer space, the Treaty of Lisbon 
was hoped for to present at least a courageous 
step forward. When its failed predecessor, the 
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 
was being negotiated and drafted, it had 
included two novel provisions offering a key 
to considerably enlarging Europe’s role in 
space. 
 
Firstly, that Treaty provided in Article I-14 
that “In the areas of research, technological 
development, and space, the Union shall have 
competence to carry out activities, in 
particular to define and implement programs; 
however, the exercise of that competence shall 
not result in Member States being prevented 
from exercising theirs.”131 This clause was 
part of the Article providing for the scope of 
shared competence between the Union and its 
member states, but the last part has led 
commentators to conclude that this was not so 
much a normal shared competence, but rather 
a “parallel competence.”132 In other words, 
individual member states would retain 
sovereign discretion to draft and implement 
their own national policies and legislation in 
this area. 
 
131Article I-14(3), Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe. 
132Stephen Hobe, et al, “A New Chapter for Europe in 
Space,” Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht I: 54 (2005), 
346-347. 
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Secondly, specifically on space it was 
provided: 
 
1. To promote scientific and technical 
progress, industrial competitiveness, 
and the implementation of its 
policies, the Union shall draw up a 
European space policy. To this end, it 
may promote joint initiatives, support 
research and technological 
development, and coordinate the 
efforts needed for the exploration and 
exploitation of space. 
2. To contribute to attaining the 
objectives referred to in paragraph 1, 
European laws or framework laws 
shall establish the necessary 
measures, which may take the form 
of a European space program. 
3. The Union shall establish any 
appropriate relations with the 
European Space Agency.133 
 
By many, this was considered to represent the 
first true acceptance of a competence in space 
for the Union, even if only shared or parallel. 
This, however, overlooked the fact that 
already since 1994, with the adoption of the 
Satellite Directive,134 the Union had exercised 
a fundamental competence to regulate satellite 
communications as part of the broader 
telecommunications sector in the context of 
the European Internal Market. From that 
moment on, for example, the Commission had 
adopted more Regulations, Directives, and 
Decisions to deal with specific aspects of 
commercial satellite communications135 and 
                                                 
 
                                                
133Article III-254, Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe. 
134Commission Directive amending Directive 88/301/EEC 
and Directive 90/388/EEC, in particular with regard to 
satellite communications, 94/46/EC, of 13 October 1994. 
135For example: Commission Directive amending Directive 
90/387/EEC with regard to personal and mobile 
communications, 96/2/EC, of 16 January 1996; Commission 
Directive amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to the 
implementation of full competition in telecommunications 
markets, 96/19/EC, of 13 March 1996; Decision of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on a coordinated 
authorization approach in the field of satellite personal 
communications systems in the Community, No. 710/97/EC, 
had handed down Decisions enforcing the 
general competition regime in the sector.136 It 
also overlooked a similar regulatory 
involvement in the satellite navigation area, 
beginning with the Regulation setting up the 
Galileo Joint Undertaking in 2002.137 
 
More precisely, therefore, entry into force of 
the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe would have meant a first 
comprehensive competence in terms of scope, 
not being indirectly deduced from 
competencies in telecommunication and 
transport fields (e.g., note that Galileo was 
presented first and foremost as a tool for trans-
European transport networks, and still 
essentially resides with the Commission’s 
Directorate on Transport and Energy). This 
 
 
of 24 March 1997; Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on a common framework for general 
authorizations and individual licenses in the field of 
telecommunications services, 97/13/EC, of 10 April 1997; 
Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the selection and authorization of systems providing mobile 
satellite services (MSS); No. 626/2008/EC, of 30 June 2008. 
136For example: Commission Decision relating to a 
proceeding pursuant to Article 85 of the EC Treaty and 
Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (IV/34.768 – International 
Private Satellite Partners), No. 94/895/EC, of 15 December 
1994; Commission Decision declaring a concentration to be 
incompatible with the common market and the functioning of 
the EEA Agreement (IV/M.490 – Nordic Satellite 
Distribution), No. 96/177/EC, of 19 July 1995; Commission 
Decision relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EC 
Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (IV/35.518 – 
Iridium), No. 97/39/EC, of 18 December 1996; Commission 
Decision declaring a concentration to be compatible with the 
common market according to Council Regulation (EEC) No 
4064/89 (IV/M.1564 – Astrolink), of 25 June 1999; 
Commission Decision declaring a concentration to be 
compatible with the common market according to Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 (IV/M.4465 - Thrane and 
Thrane/Nera), of 21 March 2007; Commission Decision 
declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common 
market and the EEA Agreement (COMP/M.4403 – 
Thales/Finmeccanica/Alcatel Alenia Space & Telespazio), of 
4 April 2007; Commission Decision declaring a concentration 
to be compatible with the common market according to 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 (IV/M.4709 – Apax 
Partners/Telenor Satellite Services), of 20 August 2007, 
137Council Regulation setting up the Galileo Joint 
Undertaking, No. 876/2002/EC, of 21 May 2002. 
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was not generally considered to be subject to 
dispute, and even as the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe was running into 
trouble, this clause was expected to survive.138 
 
As it turned out, by way of an unpleasant 
surprise for the supporters of European space 
cooperation, the Treaty of Lisbon did take one 
fundamental step backwards here. The Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union as 
per the Treaty of Lisbon in relevant part firstly 
faithfully copies Article I-14 of the Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe that 
was stated above.139 
 
Secondly, however, the Treaty now provides: 
 
1. To promote scientific and technical 
progress, industrial competitiveness, 
and the implementation of its 
policies, the Union shall draw up a 
European space policy. To this end, it 
may promote joint initiatives, support 
research and technological 
development, and coordinate the 
efforts needed for the exploration and 
exploitation of space.  
2. To contribute to attaining the 
objectives referred to in paragraph 1, 
the European Parliament and the 
Council, acting in accordance with 
the ordinary legislative procedure, 
shall establish the necessary 
measures, which may take the form 
of a European space program, 
excluding any harmonization of the 
laws and regulations of the Member 
States. 
3. The Union shall establish any 
appropriate relations with the 
European Space Agency. 
4. This Article shall be without 
prejudice to the other provisions of 
this Title. 140 
                                                 
                                                138Stephen Hobe, et al, “A New Chapter for Europe in 
Space,” Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht I: 54 (2005), 
346. 
139Article 4(3), Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. 
140Ibid., Article 189. 
Note that paragraphs 1 and 3 are identical to 
paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article III-254 of the 
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 
and that paragraph 4, though not present in the 
latter, does only confirm the default 
relationship. Thus, paragraph 2 is the key 
difference here. 
 
First, it replaces the reference to European 
laws and framework laws (the new names 
proposed by the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe for Regulations and 
Directives) with a more complicated formula, 
which in essence still refers to EC secondary 
law.141 Second, a clause is now added 
excluding from any such EU competence the 
possibility to use Regulations, Directives, or 
Decisions for the purpose of harmonizing laws 
and regulations of EU member states. 
Consequently, the EU competence on space is 
now limited to adopting secondary EU law 
that either (1) establishes a space project or 
space program and presumably takes care of 
its financing through EU budgets, or (2) 
applies the freedoms of movement of goods, 
services, persons and capital as well as the 
competition regime to the space sector, as the 
remaining key pillars of the Internal Market 
not covered by the last clause of paragraph 2. 
 
With regard to the latter, moreover, with the 
exception of areas of satellite 
telecommunications and satellite navigation 
where the leadership role of the Commission 
and also in the legislative domain is generally 
accepted and already has led to secondary EU 
law being adopted, actual adoption of 
Regulations, Directives, or Decisions may run 
into problems. Any existence of member state 
regulation on any such topic – as part of the 
exercise of member state competence, left 
 
141The “ordinary legislative procedure” referred to here is 
described as “the joint adoption by the European Parliament 
and the Council of a regulation, directive or decision on a 
proposal from the Commission.” See Ibid., Article 289(1) and 
Article 294. 
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unhampered under Article 4(3) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union – 
might be expected either to exclude ipso facto 
a right for the EU institutions to adopt 
secondary EU law, or lead to sufficient 
opposition in the Council to preclude such 
adoption in practice. 
 
Still, the combined force of existing 
competencies in the satellite communication 
and satellite navigation fields, the clauses of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, and the subsidiarity principle vis-à-vis 
the inherently global domain of outer space 
may well lead to increasing activity of the EU 
institutions in the space domain. Once the 
Council would be convinced that it is in the 
overarching interest to do so, the framework 
briefly outlined above certainly would allow 
this to happen. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
From the above analyses of the often 
painstaking and complicated processes of 
European integration, it may be concluded that 
the involvement of key intergovernmental 
entities in Europe, including the European 
Union and ESA, in space security is rapidly 
evolving at least on a political and visibility 
level, even as such involvement is crucially 
shaped by the institutional structures and the 
roles of the member states in delineating 
relevant competencies. The outside reality that 
space activities are almost always inherently 
security-sensitive or even simply developed 
from security needs has caught up with the 
principled prohibition in the relevant 
documents (for the European Union at least 
until the Treaty on European Union) to 
become fundamentally involved in security 
issues. The European flagship projects, 
Galileo and GMES, may be seen as clear 
indicators that indeed a gradual acceptance of 
the inevitability of involvement of the Union 
and the Agency into the field of space security 
has started to occur. 
 
This process so far has been largely an 
indirect one, bringing many factors together – 
the increasing entanglement, even 
convergence, of ESA and the EU, the gradual 
swallowing of the WEU by the latter (where 
perhaps that process is most advanced with 
respect to the space part of the WEU), the 
double perspective of security and space from 
which the Union is addressing space security, 
the joint development of the flagship projects, 
the specific focus on international trade in and 
exports of security-sensitive technology, and 
trying to cope with potential Internal Market-
distorting consequences of national licensing 
regimes on export control. The process is 
further driven by the political will of the 
Union to be in Europe’s driver’s seat with 
regard to global developments, such as 
concerning the Wassenaar Arrangement and 
the MTCR, but also Space Situational 
Awareness and other space security-related 
issues. 
 
The failed Treaty Establishing a Constitution 
for Europe and the successful Treaty of 
Lisbon from that perspective together 
represented the extent to which the EU and its 
leading institutions, first of all the 
Commission, were able to move along that 
path so far, and establish a first measure of 
legislative and regulatory coherence on the 
European front. The results, as analyzed, are 
rather mixed and certainly do not overcome 
many of the complications, sometimes 
perhaps even inconsistencies, arising as a 
result from the manifold angles from which 
issues of space security are addressed in 
Europe. 
 
For example, in spite of the increasing 
cooperation of the Union and ESA in matters 
of space policy, and now even projects, a full-
fledged integration of ESA into the Union 
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does not seem to be plausible for now. Issues, 
such as the conflicting approach to the 
financing of space industry in the context of 
European space projects, with ESA largely 
still forced to adhere to the “fair return” 
concept and the Union insisting on open and 
competitive procurement, will therefore 
continue to require ad-hoc solutions, as was 
achieved for example for Galileo. In that 
sense, institutionally speaking, Europe has not 
yet moved fundamentally beyond the 
Framework Agreement. This is not to 
diminish the value and importance of what has 
been achieved. 
 
To paraphrase the most famous quote in space 
history, it may not be the giant leap hoped for, 
but it is a small step forward opening up the 
prospect of more steps in the same direction. 
Security is also high on the agenda in Europe, 
space is increasingly playing an indispensable 
role in that context, and the flagship projects 
may well turn out to prove that the best way to 
deal with these issues would be by allowing 
more space for integrated decision-making at 
a European level, in which case both the 
European Union and ESA will be 
indispensable players – or at the very least 
indispensable vehicles for the sovereign 
member states to ensure their individual 
interests would not unduly obstruct the 
overarching European interests in security, 
space, and in space security. 
 
